The Main Bone of Contention by Kent Bach
AbstrAct
I enumerate the main disagreements between 
Devitt and me, and then elucidate the most 
fundamental one. It concerns what it takes to 
refer to something. Devitt takes a liberal view 
on this, according to which a speaker’s having a 
certain object in mind and intending to refer to 
it puts the hearer in a position to form singular 
thoughts about it. There is no requirement that 
the hearer have any independent access to the 
object. My view is more restrictive, not allow-
ing “reference borrowing” of the sort that Devitt 
apparently thinks referential uses of definite de-
scriptions involve. For me, if the speaker has a 
certain object in mind and intends to refer the 
hearer to it, and the hearer recognizes this inten-
tion, that merely enables him to form a general 
thought. It does not enable him to form a singu-
lar thought about it himself.
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this time around I will confine myself to identifying the points of disagree-
ment between Michael Devitt and me. I 
will be brief. As I will suggest, our main 
point of disagreement goes beyond issues 
in the semantics and pragmatics of defi-
nite descriptions, and cannot be resolved 
here. 
Devitt and I disagree on how referential 
uses of definite descriptions are to be 
explained. In fact, “A Note on bach” sug-
gests that in this regard we disagree on 
what we disagree about. He says it con-
cerns whether referential uses are to be 
explained semantically (Devitt) or prag-
matically (bach). I don’t think he quite 
means that. His point is that singular def-
inite descriptions have referential mean-
ings, as well as quantificational mean-
ings, and that this is due to a semantic 
ambiguity in the definite article. but his 
explanation of referential uses is partly 
pragmatic, if for no other reason than 
that if definite descriptions are ambigu-
ous, they must be disambiguated. And 
disambiguating – figuring out which way 
the speaker intends an expression to be 
taken – is a pragmatic matter.
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The semantic-pragmatic question is important if for no other reason than this. On the am-
biguity theory, it seems to be a remarkable linguistic coincidence that in many languages 
singular noun phrases introduced by the definite article should have both referential and 
quantificational meanings. One would expect there to be plenty of languages with two 
definite articles, each with one meaning, but there in fact aren’t. The obvious way to avoid 
this problem is to suppose that the dual use of singular definite descriptions is a pragmatic 
regularity, one whose explanation is the same for any language that has a definite article.
At any rate, there is a further reason why, even if the referential/attributive distinction 
is partly explained by a semantic ambiguity, the explanation for referential uses is part-
ly pragmatic. This reason applies whenever the description is incomplete (there is no 
unique F).  For the hearer has to figure out not only that a use is referential but which 
F the speaker is using ‘the F’ to refer to. even if Devitt’s semantic convention for using 
descriptions to refer exists, obviously it does not determine which F a speaker is using 
‘the F’ to refer to. According to Devitt, “A speaker expressing a singular thought about 
a certain object participates in the referential convention and thus exploits the causal-
perceptual link to that object; a hearer participates in the referential convention and thus 
takes account of clues to what has been thus exploited” (p. 22). but the causal-percep-
tual link that enables the speaker to form singular thoughts about a particular object and 
thereby be in a position to refer to that object is not the same causal-perceptual link that 
ties the hearer to that object and enables the hearer to form singular thoughts about it, 
including the thought that it is the object the speaker is talking about. The hearer first has 
to figure out which object that is. And that too is a pragmatic matter.
Devitt complains that I say a lot about what my view is not but not much about what 
it is. true, I do not spell how the pragmatic story goes, but my excuse is that there is 
nothing special that needs to be said in regard to the particular case of identifying a 
speaker’s reference in using a definite description that isn’t part of the general explana-
tion for how hearers figure out what speakers mean when they don’t make what they 
mean fully explicit. Philosophy can say only so much in this regard – the rest is a matter 
for cognitive and interpersonal psychology. I could cite the work of Grice and my own 
embellishments on it, but that probably wouldn’t satisfy Devitt if what he is looking for 
is something specific to the case of identifying speakers’ references with descriptions.
Devitt also complains about my account of how the quantificational meaning of defi-
nite descriptions facilitates referential uses. He contends that my account leaves their 
quantificational meaning “detached” from their referential use. Now he and I agree that 
most referential uses of definite descriptions are of incomplete ones and that most uses 
of incomplete ones are referential. but he is not satisfied with my appeal to the interac-
tion between the definite article ‘the’ (in the unspecial case of english) and the singu-
larity of the nominal it introduces to account for the implication of uniqueness by ‘the 
F’. Given this implication and the fact that ‘F’ does not apply uniquely, the task of the 
hearer is to limit the range of the Fs under consideration to one. This can be done either 
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by implicitly restricting ‘F’, as if it were modified with an adjective or a relative clause, 
or by latching on to a particular F that one takes to be the F the speaker has in mind 
and intends to be referring one to. either way, the hearer has to fill in the gap between 
the semantic content of the sentence the speaker utters and what he means in uttering 
it. As I suggested in my paper, there is no deep difference in what happens in the two 
cases, despite the fact in the referential case the speaker means a singular proposition 
and in the attributive case he means a general one. In either case the hearer has to find 
a plausible candidate for what the speaker could have intended by using ‘the F’ when ‘F’ 
does not uniquely apply to anything. 
This leads me to the fundamental disagreement between Devitt and me. It concerns 
what it takes to refer. Devitt seems to take a liberal view of what it takes, on which a 
speaker’s having a certain object in mind and intending to refer to it puts the hearer in a 
position to form singular thoughts about the same object. There is no requirement that 
the hearer have any independent access to the object. My view, laid out, appropriately 
enough, in “What it takes to refer?”, is more restrictive, and does not allow “reference 
borrowing” of the sort that Devitt apparently thinks referential uses of definite descrip-
tions involve. For me, unlike Devitt, if the speaker has a certain object in mind (by 
virtue of being in a “perceptual-causal link” to it) and intends to refer the hearer to it, 
and the hearer recognizes this intention, that is not enough to enable the hearer to form 
a singular thought about the object. It merely enables him to form a general thought, 
albeit one capable of being made true by the object in question (in non-modal cases 
anyway), but not a singular thought about that object. Merely knowing that someone 
has a certain object in mind in connection with his use of a definite description is not 
enough to put one in a position to form singular thoughts about that object oneself. 
This, I believe, is the basic bone of contention between Devitt and me. It goes much 
deeper than our dispute about definite descriptions. If that is right, then he and I are 
not so much going around in circles as at an impasse.
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